# USDT0 freezes 6.18 million tokens linked to Binance hack Author: Abdullah Özkurt Language: English Published: 2026-10-30T16:44:33+03:00 Updated: 2026-10-30T19:59:06+03:00 ![Conceptual image of a green Tether symbol held in a titanium clamp beside an open transfer gate.](https://kriptometa.com/uploads/usdt-binance-saldirisiyla-baglantili-milyon-tokeni-dondurdu-de89cf3e402b_article.webp) ## Key takeaways - USDT0’s co-founder says 6.18 million USDT0 linked to the Binance hack was frozen on Polygon. - The notices pausing and reopening Ethereum–TRON transfers were published 3 hours and 33 minutes apart. - Freezing stops tokens from being sent from the affected address; repaying customers requires a separate step. USDT0 says it froze tokens on Polygon before the attacker could swap them for other assets. The team has reopened Ethereum–TRON transfers after a precautionary pause, but extra checks may delay some transactions. USDT0 co-founder Lorenzo Romagnoli said [on October 30](https://x.com/zerolore/status/2116088426097181000) that his team froze 6.18 million USDT0 on Polygon linked to the Binance hack. He said they stopped the attacker from swapping the tokens for assets that could not be frozen. ## Ethereum–TRON transfers resume After the attack on [crypto exchange](https://kriptometa.com/en/best-crypto-exchanges) Binance was confirmed, the team temporarily halted USDT transfers between Ethereum and TRON to prevent stolen funds from moving. It paused the transfer service USDT0 operates, rather than stopping either blockchain. USDT0 announcements on October 29–30, 2026; all times UTC | Time | Announcement | |---|---| | October 29, 21:27 | Ethereum–TRON USDT transfers paused as a precaution. | | October 29, 23:35 | The co-founder reported 6.18 million USDT0 frozen on Polygon. | | October 30, 01:00 | Ethereum–TRON transfers reported back up and running. | The [pause notice](https://x.com/USDT0_to/status/2115918569762652298) and reopening notice were published 3 hours and 33 minutes apart. The table shows announcement times; the exact times of the onchain transactions have not been independently verified for this report. In his detailed account at 08:42 UTC, Romagnoli said Tether had frozen more than 1.3 billion stolen USDT. The team then judged the risk of stolen funds passing through its system to be minimal and reopened transfers. That amount refers to USDT, while the 6.18 million tokens frozen on Polygon are USDT0. The team continues to monitor network activity closely and says extra checks may temporarily delay some crosschain transfers. It has not said when pending transactions will finish. Binance’s customer withdrawal service is separate: in its [October 30 update at 04:36 UTC](https://kriptometa.com/en/binance-6-3-billion-hack-withdrawals-halted), the exchange said it was keeping withdrawals closed during security work. In the reopening post below, USDT0 says its infrastructure was unaffected by the attack and remains secure. That is the team’s own security assessment. [USDT0’s October 30 announcement that Ethereum–TRON transfers had resumed](https://x.com/USDT0_to/status/2115971975034396882) ## What does the Polygon freeze block? Romagnoli said the team initially found no related activity when it began monitoring every USDT0 network with transaction-monitoring and compliance partners. About 20 minutes later, it detected new drains on Polygon. It quickly froze the tokens with approval from its multisignature signers. According to [the technical documentation](https://docs.usdt0.to/technical-documentation/token-features/additional-behavior), the owner of the USDT0 [smart contract](https://kriptometa.com/en/glossary/smart-contract) can add [wallet addresses](https://kriptometa.com/en/glossary/wallet-address) to a blocklist. A blocked address cannot send tokens, and a blocked account cannot call `transferFrom` to transfer on another account’s behalf. Versions that support EIP-3009 signed transfers also apply the block to those functions. However, [the Polygon version does not support EIP-3009](https://docs.usdt0.to/technical-documentation/token-features/). Placing and removing a block creates separate onchain event records. Freezing the tokens prevents the attacker from sending them to another address. Returning them to Binance or its customers requires a separate transaction. USDT0 has not said that the 6.18 million tokens have been returned or announced when they might be. Romagnoli’s [initial freeze post](https://x.com/zerolore/status/2115950609258217730) includes a Polygon transaction link. The token amount and details of the freeze are based on the team’s account. ## How USDT0 moves USDT across networks USDT0 lets users access the dollar-pegged [stablecoin](https://kriptometa.com/en/glossary/stablecoin) USDT across different networks. In [its basic transfer model](https://docs.usdt0.to/), a user locks USDT in an adapter contract on Ethereum, and the system mints the same amount of USDT0 on the destination network. On the way back, [USDT0 is burned](https://kriptometa.com/en/glossary/token-burning) and the locked USDT is released. LayerZero’s verifier networks check the messages sent between networks for those transactions. Networks such as TRON, which retain their existing USDT contracts, connect through the [Legacy Mesh](https://docs.usdt0.to/overview/the-legacy-mesh). USDT enters a [liquidity pool](https://kriptometa.com/en/glossary/liquidity-pool) on the source network, and the transfer passes through the USDT0 hub on Arbitrum before reaching the destination network. Users can make [crosschain transfers](https://kriptometa.com/en/glossary/blockchain-bridge) without replacing their existing USDT contracts. TRON has no separate USDT0 contract: its existing USDT is locked and released instead. On Polygon PoS, the existing USDT contract has been upgraded to USDT0. The team can use the token’s blocklist to stop particular addresses from sending tokens. It can also pause its Ethereum–TRON service to stop transfers along that route. The announced freeze and transfer pause do not apply to every USDT holder’s balance. Romagnoli urged other protocols to monitor every network they support, be ready to mobilize signers within minutes and establish contacts with token issuers and compliance teams in advance.